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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STA'fE OF UTAH 
ELIZA Rl' f~ WOOD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
THEO N. WOOD and 
RUTH L. WOOD, 
Defendants atnd Respondents. 
Case 
No. 8886 
APP·ELLANT''S BRIEF 
STATEJ!fEN1, OF FACTS 
The judgment appealed from was entered at the 
conclusion of a jury trial of an action involYing charges 
of negligence and countercharges of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk, wherein the Court 
instructed the jury to return the verdict of no cause of 
action in fav0r of defendants and against plaintiff (R. 
1-3, 104A, 105). 
Defendants are son and daughter-in-law, respec-
tively, of plaintiff and occupy a residence at 6268 South 
9th East in Salt Lake County, Utah, which residence was 
the scene of the accident of which the plaintiff com-
plains (R. 11, 14). 
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On the day of the accident, October 15, 1956, plain-
tiff telephoned defendant Ruth L. Wood (hereinafter 
referred to as "Ruth") to confer with her about making 
arrangements for the wedding of plaintiff's granddaugh-
ter, the offspring of plaintiff's second daughter. The 
wedding was to occur on October 26, 1956, some eleven 
days subsequent to the time the accident occurred (R. 
1.2). Ruth had previously offered to address invitations 
and to make one of the bridesmaid's dresses, and during 
the telephone conversation advised plaintiff that these 
were ready for plaintiff to call for at defendant's home, 
whereupon plaintiff told Ruth that she (plaintiff) would 
come out to the defendants' home that evening. Ruth 
then said, ''If there are no lights in the front of the 
house we'll be in the back room watching television" 
(R. 12). 
Plaintiff was driven by her husband to the residence 
of the defendants on the evening of October 15, 1956. 
\Vhen they arrived it was nighttime. The plaintiff and 
her husband drove up the defendants' driveway, stop-
ping a few feet in front of the partition that separates 
the two garage door·wa~-s of the defendants' double 
garage. The ga ra~e door nearest the living quarters of 
defendants, i. P. the door to the east, was open (R. 45, 
line 19 to H. -Hi, line 1; R. 73, lines 1 through 4). ~-\. car 
'Yas parked in the east half of the garage next to the 
living quarters (H. 72, lines 9-18 and exhibit 2-P). Only 
the rear part, i. t'. the den of the home was lighted (R. 46, 
lines 9 and 10). Earlier in the day the defendant Ruth 
Wood said, "If there are no lig-hts in the front of the 
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house, we will be in the back room (den)." ( R. 12, lines 
19 through 21) 
rrhe plaintiff's husband turned off the automobile 
lights, the plaintiff proceeded out the right door of the 
car and the plaintiff's husband out the left (R. 46, line 
28 through R. 4 7, line 6). At this point of time (and be-
fore) the plaintiff saw emanating from the right-hand 
side of the garage rays of light of low intensity, which 
she surmised and which in fact came from cracks sur-
rounding the closed door of the ''den'' or rear part of 
the residence (R. 17, lines 13 through 16). However, the 
garage itself was almost totally dark (R. 40, lines 9 
through 11). The rest of the house was also dark as it 
was outside the house, since it was nighttime (R. 12, 17, 
46, 47 and 14, lines 18 and 19). 
There is to consider the plaintiff's knowledge and 
situation immediately prior to her entrance into the de-
fendants' garage and fall into their stairwell. The plain-
tiff had visited the premises twice before, once when the 
home was under construction (when the stairwell did 
not exist) and once when she and her husband had vis-
ited the premises in 1955 (probably in December) some 
ten months prior to the accident. (See R. 50, line 29 to 
R. 51, line 12 ; R. 17, line 22 through R. 18, line 1 ; R. 36, 
lines 5 through 8; R. 75, lines 17 through 19.) At the 
time of the December visit, plaintiff did not enter 
through the garage entrance, but rather entered the front 
door, was shown the interior of the house and then was 
conducted from the den, through the den door, and to the 
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left down the stairwell in the garage. (See R. 17, line 
24 through R. 18, line 10 and exhibit 4-P.) This tour was 
made by flashlight and a fair inference follows that the 
lights installed in the garage were off. In fact, there is 
no evidence that at that time or any other time prior to 
her accident she acquired knowledge that the garage in 
fact had lights. (See R. 17, lines 24 through 30.) 
It is true that the plaintiff had some "knowledge," 
prior to her entrance into the garage that a stairwell 
existed in the garage, and on the side nearest the living 
quarters but she did not know the approximate location 
of the stairwell, the fact that the cement was elevated 
around it, nor how far out the stairwell extended into the 
garage. Further, she did not know and had no way of 
ascertaining the distance between the stairwell and the 
ear parked in the garage around which she was to pass 
(and in doing so, fall into the stairwell). (R. 36, and 37, 
lines 1 through 18; R. 16, lines 27 through 30; exhibit 
2-P.) Furthermore, on the sole previous occasion of see-
ing the stairwell under flashlight illumination (ten 
months prior to the accident) the plaintiff was assured 
by Ruth at that time that a protertiYe iron railing was 
going to be installed around the dangerous stairwell. 
To rite the record at pages 75 and 76: 
(HliTH) ,\. \Ye talkl'(! ahout it H~ we were walk-
ing down stair~. 
( l\lu. 1 1~\·Ax~) Q. And what did vou saY about it 
pl en se ? X ow, this i ~ 011 the orrasi.on of Derember 
of 19:>5, is that rig-ht! 
:\. rrlwr0a bouts. 
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Q. All right. Now, what did you say to Mrs. 
Wood about the stairway on that occasion f 
A. I can't remember. I couldn't remember that. 
The fact that we had put the stairway there was 
discussed. 
Q. And you discussed the fact that you at one 
time planned on putting it down from the kitchen 
down into the basement f 
A. That is right. 
Q. And that you changed your plans and you had 
put it down into the garage 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. And did you discuss with her that you were 
going to put up a railing or a wall to separate 
that stairway from the garage 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so you told Eliza Rue Wood when she was 
on this inspection of your house that you had 
planned on putting up an iron railing or a wall to 
separate the garage from the stairwell, is that 
right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And had you ever thereafter told her that that 
iron railing or wall had not been put up 1 
A. I can't recall whether it was mentioned or not. 
The promised protective railing was never installed 
(Exhibit 2-P). Plaintiff neither knew nor ·was advised 
that in fact the railing had not been installed (R. 36, 76). 
Further, she was given no warning about coming in 
through the garage on the night in question (R. 18, 19). 
Additionally, there was testimony that, owing to emo-
tional upset and concern over the wedding, plaintiff had 
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temporarily forgotten about the stairwell immediately 
prior to her fall (R. 78). 
It should be mentioned at this juncture that alter-
nate routes were available to the plaintiff to seek entrance 
into the den of the home. These consisted of the walkway 
leading to the front entrance and a walkway around the 
garage to the back of the house. However, both walkways 
were also unlighted-dark (R. 39, 40). 
At the pre-trial before another judge of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, both parties made motions 
for summary judgments in their favor, based upon plain-
tiff's and defendants' depositions. The Court ordered 
the depositions to be opened and published for the pur-
pose of entertaining the motions, and subsequently 
denied both motions (R. 4-8). The plaintiff's deposition 
and her testimony at trial are very substantially the same. 
At the close of the testimony at trial, the Trial Court 
received and granted defendants' motion for a directed 
verdict, on the specific and sole basis that the plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
(See the record at p. 101, line 24 through p. 102, line 25.) 
Judgment was entered on the verdict. Thereupon, 
plaintiff made a motion for a new trial. The Trial Court 
denied the motion and instead affirmed its direction of 
verdiet, basing the affirmation upon the ''evidence taken 
at trial and the argument of counsel, and upon the rules 
announced in the case of Tempr'st v. Rirhardson, 5 Utah 
2d 174 (299 P. 2d 1~4), and the cases therein cited." 
(R. 107) 
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STATEMEXT OF, POINT RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
TI!E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
THE .JURY TO RETURN A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (RESPON"DENTS) 
AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF (APPEL-
LANT) OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON. 
ARG lT l\IENT 
PorNT I. 
r:rHE rrRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
THE JURY ':1_10 RETURN A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS (RESPONDENTS) 
AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF (APPEL-
LANT) OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION, AND IN 
ENTERING JUDGMENT THEREON. 
The alleged error of which the plaintiff complains 
consists in the granting by the Trial Court of the defend-
ants' motion for a directed verdict in their favor on 
the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
Thus, the ultimate issue presented by the plaintiff's 
appeal is whether or not, from the evidence contained in 
the record, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
The law is clear as to when a court may properly 
take a case from the jury and grant a motion for a di-
rected verdict on the basis of the plaintiff being guilty 
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of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In Stickle 
v. Union Pacific R. Co. 251 P. 2d 867, 122 Utah 477, Su-
preme Court of "Utah, December 23, 1952, the Court states 
the following at the bottom of page 870 in the left-hand 
column: 
'' ... tl1e question of contributory negligence is for 
the jur~· whenever the evidence is such that jurors, 
acting fairly and reasonably, may say that they 
are not eonvinced by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which proximately contributed to cause his own 
injury. 
"It should be kept in mind that so far as the 
quantum of proof necessary to take the question 
of contributory negligence from the jury is con-
cerned, the tests are the same as with respect to 
primary negligence. For instance, in a given case, 
there may be some evidence upon which a finding 
of negligence by the defendant could be based, yet 
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that 
they may fairly say that they are not convinced by 
preponderance of evidence that the defendant was 
negligent, and based upon such failure of proof 
may refuse to find a verdict against him. It would 
only be when the defendant's negligence had been 
established with such certaint~- that all reasonable 
men must conclude that he did not exercise rea-
sonable rare, that the court would rule as a matter 
of law that he was negligent and direct the jury to 
find a verdict against him; conYersely, if evidence 
were such that reasonable men may fairl~- say that 
they nre not convinced from a preponderance of 
tlw <.\vidence that was guilty of negligence, the 
court could not rule that was negligent as a matter 
of law and take the case from the jury.'' 
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It should be noted that in the above ease the trial 
court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal on the 
ground that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence 
proximately contributing to the cause of his own injury; 
however, the Supreme Court of Utah reversed the action 
of the trial court, stating that the question of contribu-
tory negligence should have been submitted to the jury. 
The above case is quoted with approval in DeW eesP 
v. J. C. Penney Co., 297 P. 2d 898, 5 Utah 2d 116, Supreme 
Court of Utah, May 25, 1956. At page 902, the upper 
right-hand column, the Court makes the following 
comments: 
"As was stated in Stickles v. Union Pacific R. 
Company, 'the question of contributory negligence 
is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that 
jorors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that 
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which proximately contributed to cause his own 
injury.' The action of the trial judge was consis-
tent with policy which has invariably been ap-
proved by this court of submitting disputed issues 
as to negligence and contributory negligence to the 
jury unless the matter is so clear as to be free 
from doubt and reasonable minds would not differ 
thereon.'' 
In accordance with the general rule, the De Weese 
case states that in ruling upon the propriety of a directed 
verdict, the court of appeal must consider the evidence 
contained in the record ''in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.'' See page 902, the upper left-hand column. 
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In brief, then, the Court in considering the plaintiff's 
appeal must draw all inferences from the evidence most 
favorable to the plaintiff and then determine whether or 
not jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, might say that 
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence. If 
jurors could say they were not so convinced, then the 
plaintiff should prevail in this appeal. 
Before the factual circumstances of the case are 
reviewed for the Court's consideration, it is deemed help-
ful to note how courts in the past have applied the above 
test. Only one case need be cited: Wilkerson v. McCarthy 
et al, 69 S. Ct .413, 336 U. S. 53, 93 L. Ed. 497, U. S. Su-
preme Court, January 31, 1949. This case was a personal 
injury action rising under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. (While it is true that this case is a negligence-
on-the-part-of-the-defendant case, yet it will be recalled 
from the opinion of StickleY. [Inion Pacific R. Company, 
that the quantum of proof necessary to take the question 
of contributory negligence from the jury is the same as 
that in respect to primary negligenee. It is to be observed 
further that general rules of negligence apply in F.E.L.A. 
cases, for under the applicable statute ( 45 USCA 51) the 
term "negligence'' is gi,·en no enlargement or variation 
over its common hnY meaning. See in this regard: 
Tlwmpsm1 Y. A. T. d': 8. F. Ry Co. (Cal.) 217 P. 2d 
45; 96 CA2 974; Esca.ndou v. Pan American For-
ei.rtn CorJJ., 88 F. ~d :2/fi. CCA Tex. 1937; and the 
eomments and easPs t ... ited in )J ote 29 of 45 
USCL\ ;)1.) 
10 
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In brief, the facts of the case were that the place of 
the accident was a wheel "Drop Pit" situated in the 
defendant's raihvay yard at Denver, Colorado. The pit 
was completely enclosed on three sides thereof by chains 
and on the fourth side by the side of a railway car. The 
floor of the ear was a vertieal distance above the ground 
of 44 inches. The horizontal distance between the car and 
the nearest corner chain post was between 5 and 7 inches. 
A "permanent board" traversed the pit within the chain 
and car enclosure. The top surface of this board was 
greasy and oily and had not been cleaned for several 
months. In order to advance to the other side of the pit7 
the plaintiff went around a chain post nearest the car and 
underneath the car in order to walk across the permanent 
board from which he fell. An extensive recital of measure-
ments is given in the Utah Supreme Court opinion, 187 
P. 2d 188 at 189, in order "to assist the reader in form-
ing a picture of the space through which plaintiff squeezed 
in order to get onto the board from which he fell.'' The 
trial court ruled that there was no negligence on the part 
of the defendants as a matter of law and directed a ver-
dict of ''no cause of action.'' The Supreme Court of U tab, 
at 187 P. 2d 188, affirmed the action of the trial court, with 
Mr. Justice Wade dissenting. The Supreme Court of 
the United States reversed the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Utah, stating that the issue of negligence should 
have gone before the jury in the trial court. Thus, the 
defendants were not free of negligence as a matter of 
law even though their pit was completely enclosed on 
three sides and almost completely enclosed on the fourth 
side. 
11 
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rrhe facts of the above U. S. Supreme Court case are 
much stronger than the facts of the present case. 
Considering briefly the evidence in a light most fav-
orable to the plaintiff, it is found that: 
Plaintiff was driven by her husband to the residence 
of the defendants on the evening of October 15, 1956. 
Whn they arrived it was nighttime. The plaintiff and 
her husband drove up the defendant's driveway, stopping 
a few feet in front of the partition that separates the two 
garage doorways of the defendants' double garage. The 
garage door nearest the living quarters of defendants, 
i. e. the door to the east, was open. A car was parked in 
the east half of the garage next to the living quarters. 
Only the rear, i. e. den, of the home was lighted. Earlier 
in the day the defendant Ruth Wood said, "If there are 
no lights in the front of the house, we will be in the back 
room (den)." 
The plaintiff's husband turned off the automobile 
lights, the plaintiff proceeded out the right door of the 
car and the plaintiff's husband out the left. At this point 
of time (and before) the plaintiff saw emanating from 
the right-hand side of the garage ra~~s of light of low 
intensity, which she surmised and which in fact came from 
the "den" or rear part of the residence. However, the 
garage itself was almost totally dark. The rest of the 
house was also dark as it was also outside the house, 
sinee it "~as nighttime. 
12 
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lti There is to consider the plaintiff's knowledge and 
situation immediately prior to her entrance into the de-
fendants' garage and fall into their stairwell. The plain-
tiff had visited the premises twice before, once when the 
home was under construction (when the stairwell did not 
exist) and once when she and her husband had visited 
the premises in 1955 (probably in December) some ten 
months prior to the accident. At the time of the December 
visit, plaintiff did not enter through the garage entrance, 
but rather through the front door, was shown the interior 
of the house and then was conducted from the den, 
through the den door, and to the left down the stairwell 
in the garage. This tour was made by flashlight and a 
fair inference follows that the lights installed in the ga-
rage were off. In fact, there is no evidence that at that 
time or any other time prior to her accident she acquired 
knowledge that the garage in fact had lights. 
Defendant Ruth testified that during her mother-
in-law's previous visit she had explained to her that the 
defendants had planned on putting up an iron railing or 
wall to separate the garage from the stairwell. Defend-
ants, however, failed to inform the plaintiff that, in fact, 
the proposed protective railing had never been installed. 
The plaintiff's "knowledge" relating to the details 
of the stairwell construction is meager at best. 
Most important, it is to be noted that immediately 
after the accident, when Theo Wood asked the Plaintiff 
if she didn't remember the stairwell the plaintiff an-
13 
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swered ''Yes,'' but because she had been so upset over 
the wedding which was pending she had temporarily 
forgotten about the stairwell. (See the Record at page 
78, lines 26 through 29.) The wedding referred to con-
cerned the plaintiff's granddaughter, who was to be 
married on the 26th day of October, some eleven days 
after the accident. Hence, what is found is that, imme-
diately prior to the accident, the knowledge which the 
plaintiff possessed of the stairwell and its location in the 
garage was exceedingly dim, having been acquired 
through a single visit which occurred some ten months 
previous (December, 1955), and which was temporarily 
blanketed by her present anxiety, concern, and preoccu-
pation with the pending marriage of her granddaughter. 
All that can be extracted from the testimony at R. 36, 
lines 3 through 5, R. 37, lines 1 through 5, and R. 78, 
lines 26 through 29, is that, under inferences of fact drawn 
most favorably to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was pos-
sessed of a feeble, residual "knowledge" (psychological 
conditioning) of the stair·well and its presence somewhere 
in the garage by virtue of sensory experience of traveling 
down the stairwell with the aid of the dim beam of a flash-
light some ten months previously. ~-\..nd e\en this sub-
conscious conditioning of the plaintiff was swept aside by 
the plaintiff's oYcrwhelming mental preoccupation of her 
granddaughter's pending marriage. 
We an' now at a point to consider the rules relating 
to contributory negligence. According to the Restate-
ment of Torts, Section 466, contributory negligence may 
be either of two types: 
14 
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(a) An intentional and unreasonable exposure of 
the plaintiff to danger created by the defendants' negli-
gence of which danger the plaintiff knows or has reason 
to know, or 
(b) Conduct which, in respects other than those 
stated in dause (a), falls short of the standard to which 
the reasonable man should conform in order to protect 
himself from harm. 
With reference to the clause (a) type of negligence, 
( 1) ''the plaintiff must know (accurately) of the physical 
conditions created by the defendants' negligence and must 
have knowledge of such facts that, as a reasonable man, 
he should realize the danger involved.'' Furthermore, 
(2) "the plaintiff must intentionally expose himself to 
this danger; he must have the purpose to place himself 
within reach of it. It is not enough that his failure to 
exercise reasonable attention to his surroundings pre-
vents him from observing the danger, or that lack of rea-
sonable preparation or confidence prevents him from 
avoiding it when the condition created by the defendant is 
known to him.'' Last of all, ( 3) ''his intentional exposure 
of himself to the known danger must be unreasonable.'' 
(See Restatement of Torts, Section 466 Comment c.) 
In view of the above criteria, plaintiff cannot, as a 
matter of law, be held to be guilty of contributory negli-
gence of the clause (a) type. For example, the facts show 
that the plaintiff did not have a knowledge that the stair-
well did not have a railing; in fact, she was assured by 
15 
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her son's wife ten months previous to the accident that 
a railing in fact would be installed to enclose the stairwell. 
Opposing counsel has argued that the plaintiff could 
have noticed whether or not a railing was installed around 
the stairwell since light, though of feeble intensity, eman-
ating from the edges of the closed door of the den would 
have revealed the true condition of the stairwell to the 
plaintiff. The observation made by opposing counsel is 
believed to be inaccurate. Light emanating from the door 
edges of the den toward the plaintiff would, quite prob-
ably, not reveal that a barrier did or did not exist around 
the stairwell. If in fact a barrier in the form of a rail-
ing had been installed around the stairwell, it would have 
been disposed inbetween the light and the plaintiff, and 
below line-of-sight. Afortiori, light shining upon one side 
of a railing does not reflect from its opposite side. If 
below line-of-sight, there would be no discontinuity in 
the light rays. Further, there is no evidence that there-
flectivity of the garage floor would be sufficient to render 
the dark void of the stairwell discernible. Additionally, 
the stairwell void itself could not possibly reflect light in 
the direction of the plaintiff. 
Thus, the criteria (1) and (2) of the clause (a) type 
of negligence are not satisfied. 
The remaining question then is whether or not plain-
tiff's accident constituted contributon- negligence of the 
clause (b) type. 
The ultimate issue thus reduces itself to this : 
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Did the plaintiff's conduct in respects other than that 
stated in clause (a) fall short of the standard to which 
a reasonable woman should conform in order to protect 
herself from harm'~ 
It is observed from the record that the plaintiff ap-
proached the den through the driveway and did not 
choose either to take the darkened walk around the rear 
of the garage to the den or to enter the residence through 
the front door. It is to be remembered that this is a case 
of a mother visiting the residence of her own son. It is 
not unreasonable for an intimate relative to forego the 
alternatives of knocking on the front door of a darkened 
front room or of walking down a darkened path leading 
around the garage to the back yard and to the rear of the 
den in favor of walking directly toward the light in the 
room her family indicated they would be. A reasonable 
inference would be that the plaintiff knew that a door 
leading into the den existed in the east wall of the garage, 
since she had made her exit from that very door once 
before, and since she on this night in fact saw light com-
ing from it. 
Was she neglectful of her own welfare in failing to 
search in the darkened garage for a light switch~ It is 
urged that she was not neglectful in this regard in that 
there was no evidence to show that she knew a light 
switch ever existed in the garage; further, it is noted 
that during her previous visit to the residence the tour 
thereof was hy flashlight, presumably with the garage 
lights left off. One is surely not negligent for his own 
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welfare in failing to search for a light switch in an un-
familiar darkened garage which might not even have a 
light switch. 
Let us now consider the knowledge of the plaintiff 
of the stairwell. Such knowledge, acquired through and 
experience of ten months' vintage, would at best be hazy 
immediately prior to the accident, if indeed such knowl-
edge existed at all. It is to be remembered that she had 
visited the area but once before and at that time had been 
conducted down the stairwell from the den. Now at the 
time of the previous visit, it would be a fair inference to 
presume that no automobile was present in the garage. 
Therefore, the plaintiff could have no knowledge what-
ever as to the distance between the stairwell and a car 
parked in a usual position in the garage. Beside this fact, 
however, there was evidence to show that she did not 
know how far out into the garage the stairwell extended. 
Thus, the plaintiff's knowledge of the dangerous stairwell 
could reasonably be found to ha\e been meager at best. 
Most important, it is to be obser\ed that immediately 
prior to the time of the accident the plaintiff had for-
gotten about the presence of the stairwell, owing to the 
pending wedding which was the plaintiff's immediate 
concern. 
The case of Deacy v. 11lcDonnell (Conn.), 38 A 2d 
181, 131 Conn. 101, is here cited on the issue of whether 
or not, from past experiencP, the plaintiff had acquired 
a sufficient mental impression of the dangerous condition 
18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
so as to be chargeable with actual knowledge of the dan-
gerous condition, sufficient to defeat her recovery on the 
ground of contributory negligence; or, to put it perhaps 
more accurately, the issue in question is whether or not 
the mental impression of the plaintiff concerning the 
stairwell was so strong, by virtue of her past experience, 
that she ought to be charged with the obligation of remem-
bering the dangerous condition, and that failure to re-
member would constitute contributory negligence. 
In the Deacy case the Court held that the fact that 
the plaintiff had visited the defendants' premises on four 
previous occasions and had seen the step down from 
the front doorway to the porch and passed over it on 
entering the night in question did not charge her with 
negligence in not remembering the step down and taking 
special precautions to avoid a fall on leaving in the dark-
ness. A significant portion of the decision reads as 
follows: 
''The defendant's claim, ho·wever, that the plain-
tiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
They base this on the fact of her previous visits to 
the premises, and the further findings that on 
the night in question, in going to her sister's room 
she (plaintiff) had followed the same course as 
she did when she was leaving; that she knew that 
the stairway and entrance were unlighted ; and 
that she asked for no light and did not use a match 
or flashlight hut proceeded to grope her way in the 
dark. That on previous visits she had seen the 
step at the doorway and had passed over it when 
she entered the building on the night in question 
would not in itself convict her of negligence in not 
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membering it and taking special precautions to 
avoid a fall because of it.'' 
The rule of the Deacy case relating to contributory 
negligence represents the overwhelming weight of au-
thority on the subject. See for example: 
Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Compa;ny 
(Cal.), 282 P. 2d 69,44 C 2d 225, at page 76. 
"Defendant's main contention is that the (jury) 
instruction is not a correct statement of the law in 
that momentary forgetfulness cannot indicate lack 
of contributory negligence unless plaintiff is act-
ing after being confronted with a sudden and dis-
turbing situation (which was not present, but 
which is present in the instant case) which causes 
the forgetfulness ... The rule with respect to the 
bearing of forgetfulness on contributory negli-
gence has been stated in many cases. As expressed 
in many cases and recent ones, whether forgetfui-
ness of a keen danger constitutes contributory 
negligence is a question for the trier of fact, giving 
consideration to the circumstances even though 
there is no sudden disturbance or peril confront-
ing the plaintiff and causing the lapse of mem-
ory; to forget is not negligence unless it shows a 
want of of ordinary care. Generally the question 
is one for the jury.'' (approximately 20 cases and 
articles cited) 
" ... As is said in Jacobsen'· Oakland ~feat Com-
pany, 119 P. 653, one element in all these cases 
is the plaintiff's familiarifN with the danger he 
forgot. To arbitrarily adopt as a standard of neg-
ligence per se the rule that if one may be charged 
with a knowledg-e, past or present, of a danger, he 
is precluded from recovery for injuries sustained 
therefrom and let the rule rest there for all cases 
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would be to establish a doctrine dangerous in its 
application and unsound in principle and one not 
warranted by the present weight of authority .... 
The true rule to be deducted £rom the cases cited 
is that the forgetfulness shown must be under cir-
cumstances sufficient to enable a court to deter-
mine that such lack of memory constituted negli-
gence per se. . . . (emphasis supplied) 
Johnson v. Pulidy (Conn.), 165 A. 355, 116 Conn. 443. 
(In this case the Plaintiff had previously ascended 
the steps of a restaurant, had eaten her dinner, and ad-
vanced toward the head of the stairs to pay her bill, a 
place where the counter was located. There was approxi-
mately thirty ( 30) inches of space between the counter 
and the head of the stairs. She happened to step back, 
inadvertently, and fell down the stairs, thereby sustaining 
injuries. The verdict was directed for the Defendant on 
the ground of the Plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
The case was appealed and reversed in favor of the Plain-
tiff. The Court stated:) 
''Even though the Plaintiff had an opportunity 
upon entering the restaurant to see the situation 
created by the arrangements of the fixtures in 
relation to the stairway, they (the Jury) could 
also ha\'e reasonably found that she failed to real-
ize the danger, or was momentarily inattentive 
thereto. Under such circumstances, it would not 
necessarily follow that she was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. Where there is an extraordinary 
risk, mere knowledge that there is some risk or 
danger is not sufficient; there must be a compre-
hension of it before contributory negligence can be 
found .... Where the plaintiff's act was instinctive 
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or due to a momentary and excusable inattention, 
it may not constitute contributory negligence.'' 
(The case also cites 45 Cor. Jur 947 et. seq., and 
cases thereunder.) 
Osier v. Customer's Company (Idaho), 248 P. 438 
at 439, 42 Ida. 789. 
''A person, although having previous knowledge 
of the dangerous situation, but not having pres-
ently in mind the existence of the defect, is not 
guilty of contributory negligence.'' 
Now, most imprtant, during her previous visit to the 
residence the defendant Ruth Wood advised the plaintiff 
that a railing was going to be installed around the stair-
well so as to protect individuals from inadvertent falls in 
the same. Would not such an assurance yet further dim 
the memory of a dangerous condition which had not been 
noticed but once before and, at that, noticed under the 
dim beam of a flashlight? Further, could not the plain-
tiff reasonably rely upon the representation of her son's 
wife that a suitable railing would be constructed and that 
the danger at this late date would not be present' 
It is respectfully believed that jurors would be en-
tirely reasonable in sa~Ting that ~Irs. \Yoods was not neg-
ligent in failing to look for a light switch in an unfamiliar 
darkened garage, which, to her knowledge, might not eYen 
exist; further, a jury might be entirely reasonable to find 
that the plaintiff could rPly upon the defendants' repre-
sentation, made some ten months preYious to the acci-
dent, that they (the defendants) would install a protec-
tive railing about the dangerous stairwell. 
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Aside from any knowledge which the plaintiff might 
have had, was she contributorily negligent per se in en-
tering a darkened garage"? Now the risk encountered by 
one entering a darkened garage is that there might be 
objects either on the floor or elsewhere with which the 
traveler would come in contact or stumble over. The 
plaintiff, however, fell into a pit; hence the result was 
not within the risk created. Further, a jury might find 
that the risk was not unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances. 
In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted 
that gross error was made in the court's ruling that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a mat-
ter of law. Opposing counsel insists upon the relevance 
of Tempest v. Richardson, 299 P. 2d 124, 5 Utah 2d 17 4, 
Supreme Court of Utah, July 7, 1956, to the present case. 
It is to be observed that in the court below the Tempest 
case was decided on a motion for summary judgment based 
upon the pleadings and the plaintiff's deposition. It is to be 
noted in the present case, that a motion for summary 
judgment was made by the defendants, based upon the 
pleadings and the plaintiff's deposition, but that such 
motion was denied. There does not appear substantial 
difference, to the plaintiff's detriment, in the trial tran-
script from the plaintiff's deposition and pleadings. 
In the Tempest case, the plaintiff was directed by 
the host to the bathroom which she was informed would 
be lighted. Instead of going to the correct room, the plain-
tiff wandered through the house some distance to an un-
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familiar· door, opened it, and stepped "into a dark and 
unlighted· area with which she was unacquainted" and 
which in fact constituted an inside stairway leading to 
the basement of the home. In the present case, however, 
the defendants knew that the plaintiff would visit them 
that evening, they informed the plaintiff that a light 
would be on in the den of the home where the family 
would be, the plaintiff saw that light emanating from 
the den and, rather than use alternate routes to the home 
which were unlighted and in fact dark, chose to follow 
the light which she saw. The garage door nearest the den 
in being open constituted and implied an invitation to 
the plaintiff to enter. These facts clearly distinguish the 
Tempest case. 
Furthermore, the Court states in the Tempest case 
that "It is general knowledge that a great many homes 
have rooms on different levels which are reached by 
stairways.'' In the instant case the Plaintiff could not 
possibly be charged with such a type of ''general knowl-
edge'' since it is not common knowledge that some build 
unguarded stairwells in garages. 
It is respectfully believed that such "knowledge" 
that the plaintiff had at the time of her entrance into the 
garage, which knowledge was obtained hy a single trip 
down the stairwell, and taken some ten months previous 
to the accident by means of a flashlight was insufficient 
to charge the plaintiff with knowledge of the stairwell suf-
ficient to defeat her respectfully in the instant action. Par-
ticularly would it seem to be so where, as the testimony at 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial indicates, the plaintiff had temporarily for-
gotten of the stairwell's existence immediately prior to 
her entrance into the garage, owing to the urgency of said 
wedding plans. Furthermore, it would appear that the 
promise made to the plaintiff some ten months previous 
to her accident that the stairwell would be provided with 
a safety railing would further serve to smother what dim 
realization of the stairwell's existence and condition the 
plaintiff ever had. 
Accordingly, plaintiff by her counsel respectfully 
requests that she be given a new trial and that the issue 
of contributory negligence be left, properly, in the prov-
ince of the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIOT W. EVANS 
M. RALPH SHAFFER 
for EVANS & NESLEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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